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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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North  Korea  is  once  again  headed  toward  widespread  food 
shortages, hunger, and famine. As of this writing, the prospect 
of hunger-related deaths occurring in the next several months is 
approaching certainty. This expectation is based on four pieces of 
evidence, which we outline in this policy brief:
•  Food balances are as precarious as at any time since the great 
famine.
•  Access to aid or commercial imports is limited by diplomatic 
tensions and the world food crisis. 
•  Domestic food prices show the kind of extreme price infla-
tion that is typical of pre-famine or famine settings. 
•  The domestic policy response to the crisis while arguably 
rational from the perspective of a regime seeking to maintain 
power and control is exacerbating the situation.
The  North  Korean  food  crisis,  now  well  into  its  second 
decade, presents a difficult set of ethical choices. The very ruth-
lessness of the regime and the numbing repetitiveness of its food 
problems make it difficult to mobilize humanitarian assistance. 
The promise of large-scale American assistance will help over the 
long run. But in the absence of vigorous action by South Korea 
and China, the two countries capable of delivering timely assis-
tance, hunger is likely to once again claim innocent victims. 
The  North  Korean  regime  will  weather  this  challenge 
politically by ratcheting up repression, scrambling for foreign 
assistance, and guaranteeing supplies to core supporters in the 
army, security apparatus, and party. A resolution of the nuclear 
stand-off could also pave the way for increased aid and possibly 
economic reform. 
But even though the current crisis is unlikely to be of the 
magnitude of the great famine of the mid-1990s, the possibility of 
widespread social distress and even political instability cannot be 
ruled out. The problem is not simply in the short run: Shortages 
of crucial agricultural inputs such as fertilizer are setting the stage 
for continuing food problems well into 2009, and the regime’s 
response to the crisis is once again revealing a deep ambivalence 
on its part toward economic reform and opening. 
The five major parties with an interest in North Korea—
South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States—need 
to think creatively not only about the nuclear issue and the ongo-
ing humanitarian challenge but also about the possibility of a 
political crisis in North Korea. 
We begin with an analysis of the big picture: trends in the 
supply and demand for food (section I) and the constraints on 
aid and commercial imports (section II). We then turn to the 
dizzying  domestic  food  price  increases,  a  strong  sign  of  pre-
famine conditions (section III). Section IV considers the fray-
ing of the institutions of the domestic food economy and the 
domestic policy response to the crisis. The conclusion provides 
more detailed policy recommendations on how to alleviate the 
emerging distress. N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 6    mA Y   2 0 0 8
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I. FOOD BALANCES
The logic of a quantity balance is simple: The gap between 
domestic needs and production is the uncovered food balance, 
which must be met through imports, in the form of either 
commercial purchases or aid. The two largest components of 
the exercise—local production and human demand—are both 
subject to considerable uncertainty. Our analysis suggests that 
in recent years available supply has exceeded minimum grain 
requirements but that this gap has now virtually disappeared. 
Data on production are sketchy at best and highly prone 
to  politicization: When  North  Korea  seeks  aid,  the  govern-
ment exaggerates shortfalls to generate external support. The 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO),  which  is  under 
some diplomatic pressure to accept North Korean official data, 
revised its estimate of the current harvest from 4 to 3 million 
metric tons (MMT) in March 2008—a downward revision of 
25 percent. Other estimates of current grain output range from 
4.01 MMT to a low of 2.5 MMT. Yet all assessments point 
to a sharp decline in output, partly as a result of the floods of 
August 2007 and partly as a result of ongoing problems in the 
agricultural sector and the ineffective policy response of the 
government.1 
Other, quantitatively less important, components of the 
supply side of the balance sheet pose problems as well. Weak 
infrastructure for storage and transportation means that post-
harvest  losses  are  probably  large.  In  recent  years,  the  FAO/
World Food Program (WFP) assessments have simply assumed 
15 percent of the harvest is wasted, though they admit this esti-
mate is without any serious empirical basis.2 Yet “losses” may 
also reflect farmers and traders diverting food away from official 
channels  toward  consumption  and  the  market.  Shortfalls  in 
official harvest data may simply reflect the fact that the state is 
having a harder time getting access to grain. 
1. At the higher end of the production estimates, the Korean Rural Develop-
ment Administration (KRDA) shows a decline in total food equivalent of 
500,000 metric tons (MT) between the 2006 and 2007 harvests, from 4.48 
MMT to 4.01 MMT or 11 percent. The US Department of Agriculture esti-
mates show a more modest decline in output but from a lower starting point: 
from 3.49 MMT to 3.32 MMT. The FAO revision marks a large reduction 
not only from the 4 MMT of the previous year but also from the five-year av-
erage of 3.7 MMT. As with the KRDA estimates, the major cereal losses were 
in maize (650,000 tons less, or 33 percent down from the previous year) and 
in rice (400,000 tons less, or 25 percent down from the previous year). Finally, 
at the low end, the South Korean nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
Good Friends has cited an estimate of total output of 2.5 MMT but without 
extensive justification of sources or methods; this estimate should be treated as 
an extreme lower bound. For an overview of the longer-run problems in the 
agricultural sector, see Nam (2007). 
2. For a more detailed discussion of the difficulties in estimating food bal-
ances, see Haggard and Noland (2007a, 41–49; 2008).
Estimating imports is equally challenging. It is possible to 
track most aid and certainly the share passing through the WFP. 
But North Korea treats trade data as a state secret, and a number 
of  the  country’s  trade  partners—most  notably  China—are 
circumspect about revealing their aid commitments.
Demand estimates are also subject to technical pitfalls that 
render them difficult to calculate.3 Demand for feed, industrial 
uses, and rebuilding of stocks are subject to compression during 
hardship and cannot simply be treated as a given. But there is 
disagreement on even the most important component of total 
demand: human consumption. The FAO and WFP have at 
times overestimated the population, and some analysts suspect 
that the size of the North Korean population is again being over-
estimated, possibly by a significant margin. Such overestimation 
would exaggerate aggregate demand for grain. Moreover, based 
on the work of Australian economist Heather Smith, we believe 
that the FAO/WFP analysts have overestimated the role of grain 
in the North Korean diet by around 20 percent (Smith 1998). 
       Given the uncertainties in the data, our strategy is to present 
information on four estimates of notional grain requirements. 
The first is an expansive estimate of about 5 MMT derived 
from FAO/WFP reports. The second is an adjusted demand 
estimate  of  roughly  4  MMT,  which  takes  into  account  the 
historical pattern of grain consumption in North Korea and 
the fact that there are significant nongrain sources of food in 
the North Korean diet. Finally, we provide two estimates that 
encompass only total human demand, not including other uses 
such as feed; one of these is, again, unadjusted and the second 
3. Differences among demand estimates are extraordinarily large, ranging 
from a relatively expansive 6 MMT (from the KRDA) to a highly compressed, 
minimum human need demand of roughly 3 MMT. Total consumption at this 
highly compressed level would certainly not avoid hunger and even starvation; 
food would have to be distributed with utmost precision across the entire 
population. In addition to the logistical problems of moving and distributing 
grain in this fashion, we know food is not distributed equally in North Korea 
because of the political claims of the regime and the military. Widening in-
equality coupled with an increasing reliance on the market for food also means 
that some are better positioned to gain access to food than others. See Haggard 
and Noland (2008).
The long-run solution to North Korea’s 
chronic food insecurity problems is 
a revitalization of industry, which 
would allow North Korea to export 
industrial products, earn foreign 
exchange, and import bulk grains on 
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adjusts for North Korea’s historical consumption patterns and 
nongrain sources of food. These human needs estimates in effect 
extrapolate sustenance across the population. 
These  four  estimates  are  plotted  against  total  supplies 
(using the US Department of Agriculture estimate of produc-
tion) in figure 1. We focus our discussion on the second of 
these  four  estimates,  which  seems  the  most  plausible.  The 
more expansive FAO/WFP definition of needs implies repeat-
ed annual shortfalls of extraordinary magnitude; if true, they 
would already imply famine. On the other hand, the lower-
bound  estimate  represents  extreme  compression  for  purely 
human consumption and is clearly not sustainable.  
According to our preferred estimate of grain needs, the 
peak of the mid-1990s famine is reflected in the very large 
uncovered deficit in the first two years of the series. The coun-
try achieved a surplus in the late 1990s as it pulled out of 
the famine. However, it is worth noting that under the more 
expansive  FAO/WFP  conception  of  demand,  North  Korea 
has avoided food shortages in only one of the last 12 years—
2000—and then only barely. 
Trends since the beginning of the decade have relentlessly 
worsened. Production rebounded from the bad harvest of 2001 
but is once again declining. The massive inflow of aid in the 
immediate  postfamine  period  has  dwindled.  And  as  in  the 
run-up to the first famine, the regime has still not resolved the 
nuclear issue, which hangs over all of its external commercial 
relations, nor undertaken the reforms of the external sector that 
would improve its ability to access grain on commercial terms. 
The current shortfalls are not as bad as during the peak 
famine years. But the aggregate food picture appears worse than 
at any time since the great famine; the regime is now working 
with a paper-thin margin of error, less than 100,000 metric tons 
(MT) using our favored estimate of grain requirements. More-
over, the growing reliance of households on the market and 
rising prices make the implications of these findings more dire 
than in the past. But before turning to that story, it is important 
to turn to the external supply picture and trends in prices. 
II. THE ROLE OF AID 
North Korea is critically dependent at the margin on external 
sources of supply. At one level, this dependence actually makes 
sense. Given North Korea’s high ratio of population to arable 
land and its inauspicious growing conditions, the pursuit of 
self-sufficiency  has  always  been  fundamentally  misguided. 
This is why we are highly critical of explanations of North 
Korea’s food problems that focus on the weather. Weather-
related shocks have, of course, played a role in North Korea’s 
thousands of metric tons
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problems,  most  recently  the  devastating  floods  of  August 
2007. But if the weather is consistently adverse and volatile, 
it suggests that North Korea should seek to reduce its depen-
dence on domestic sources of supply. The ultimate solution 
to the country’s chronic food problems does not lie solely in 
agriculture, as welcome as such reforms would be. Rather it 
lies in reform, revitalization, and reorientation of the indus-
trial sector, which would enable it to export industrial prod-
ucts and services and import bulk grains on a commercially 
sustainable basis—just as its neighbors South Korea, Japan, 
and increasingly China do.
The current character of North Korea’s external supply 
has several distinctive features: 
•  North Korea is highly dependent on aid. The country has 
effectively become a ward of the international commu-
nity, receiving large amounts of food aid year after year. 
•  The  willingness  of  donors  to  support  the  regime  has 
declined. In addition to the country’s provocative foreign 
policy  behavior,  North  Korea  has  proven  unwilling  to 
guarantee the integrity of its aid programs and as a result 
aid relations have repeatedly been roiled by evidence of 
diversion of aid to both the military and the market.4
•  The regime has proven unwilling and in the current junc-
ture perhaps also unable to adequately tap commercial 
sources  of  supply.  Until  the  last  several  years,  aid  has 
consistently outstripped commercial imports.5 Now the 
country is more dependent on commercial imports just 
as prices are spiraling upwards. Moreover, the country’s 
lack of creditworthiness and foreign exchange earnings 
and reserves makes it a highly unreliable partner. 
We begin with a brief overview of the multilateral effort 
before turning to the behavior of the major donors, including 
South Korea and China, and the potential role of the United 
States. We then trace the ongoing difficulties the country has 
faced in importing on commercial terms. 
The World Food Program
In the fall of 2005, North Korea experienced its best harvest in 
a decade and South Korea ramped up its aid efforts. Pyongyang 
4. The most recent example of this malfeasance are photographs taken across 
the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which have appeared in the South Korean 
press. They show North Korean military personnel loading bags of South 
Korean aid grain into trucks. The absence of civilian personnel in the immedi-
ate proximity to the DMZ makes it implausible that this activity reflected 
transportation of supplies or even diversion to the market. 
5.  In Haggard and Noland (2007a), we document how the inflow of aid at 
the time of the famine was actually accompanied by a compression of com-
mercial imports, contributing to ongoing shortages; see figure 1. 
responded to these eased supply conditions by demanding that 
the WFP switch from food aid to “development assistance” 
and that all foreign personnel from private aid groups leave 
the country by year’s end. The WFP suspended its operations 
in North Korea at the end of 2005, but its Executive Board 
approved a greatly scaled-down program in February 2006.6 
The program would feed roughly 1.9 million beneficiaries, less 
than one-third of the previously targeted population, requir-
ing 150,000 MT of commodities at a cost of approximately 
$102 million.7 The North Koreans demanded a reduction in 
staff to ten or fewer, closure of the regional offices outside 
Pyongyang, and confinement of this staff to Pyongyang with 
only quarterly opportunities to visit project sites in the field. 
However,  even  if  the  WFP  were  to  deliver  the  entire 
75,000 MT for the second year of the program, it would cover 
only 4.5 percent of the gap between domestic production and 
total demand estimated by the FAO. In late March 2008, the 
WFP once again issued a dire warning about the food situa-
tion in North Korea, in part because the core WFP program8 
was sharply undersubscribed. 
South Korea
In May 2003—just seven months into the onset of the nuclear 
crisis—the North Koreans set a precedent that was to persist 
until the end of the Roh Moo Hyun administration of request-
ing very large-scale humanitarian assistance from South Korea: 
200,000 MT of fertilizer and 500,000 MT of grain, of which 
6. Initially designed to run through March 2008, the program was subse-
quently extended through the end of August 2008.
7.  Distributions focused on 50 vulnerable counties jointly selected by WFP 
and the government. Vitamin-and-mineral enriched foods produced at 
WFP-supported factories are being given to young children and pregnant and 
nursing women and cereal rations to underemployed workers through food-
for-community-development schemes aimed at rehabilitating agricultural and 
other infrastructure.
8. The WFP did initiate a four-month emergency operation that provided 
food and other assistance in the areas affected by the severe flooding in August 
2006; interestingly, over a third of the approximately $50 million raised for 
that emergency effort came not from governments but from NGOs. 
The aggregate food picture in North 
Korea appears worse than at any time 
since the famine of the 1990s. The 
margin of error between required 
grain and available supply is now 
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400,000 MT was ultimately shipped. Requests to maintain 
these levels of support were subsequently approved in June 
2004 as well. South Korean commitments were severely tested 
by the February 10, 2005 announcement that North Korea 
had nuclear weapons and was suspending its participation in 
the Six-Party Talks; only a month before this announcement, 
the  North  Korean  government  had  requested  for  500,000 
MT of fertilizer. Despite pressure from the United States and 
domestic criticism, the Roh administration once again offered 
large-scale support of 500,000 MT of fertilizer and 350,000 
MT of rice.9 
Following the bumper harvest of fall 2005, North Korea 
initially limited its aid requests to South Korea to fertilizer 
(450,000 tons). By April 2006, however, the public distribu-
tion system (PDS)—the state-run rationing system on which 
roughly two-thirds of the population theoretically depends—
was once again under stress and North Korea again requested 
the South for 500,000 MT of food and to resume fertilizer 
shipments.10 Conflicts over South Korean abductees, prisoners 
of war (POWs), and the rail links had already thrown a wrench 
in the prospects for further humanitarian assistance before the 
missile tests of July 2006. But in an important volte face from 
previous policy, South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki Moon 
warned  in  July  that  the  Roh  government  would  suspend 
further humanitarian assistance if North Korea proceeded to 
conduct missile flight tests. With the exception of a one-off 
aid package following the floods in August 2006, the admin-
istration carried through on that threat and even interrupted 
deliveries under the emergency flood program following the 
nuclear test in October.11 
The administration did signal, however, that it was will-
ing to resume aid shipments if North Korea came back to both 
the Six-Party and inter-Korean talks. Within a month of the 
February 13, 2007 Six-Party agreement, North-South inter-
ministerial meetings started up, and the Roh administration 
once again offered commitments equal to those discussed in 
the past, namely 400,000 MT of rice and 300,000 MT of 
fertilizer. The resumption of rice aid initially proved conten-
9. Nor was this all. In the negotiations leading up to the Six-Party Joint State-
ment in September 2005, the Roh administration offered a much wider array 
of so-called cooperation projects; in late 2005, the government made public 
a controversial five-year plan for over $5 billion in economic assistance to the 
North and a doubling of the annual aid budget.
10. At the time of the April request, the Roh government had committed 
to shipping 150,000 tons of fertilizer but had not taken a decision on the 
remaining 300,000 tons included in Pyongyang’s initial request. 
11. The $230 million aid package included 100,000 MT of rice, which ac-
counted for just over $200 million of the total. The North Koreans responded 
to the regular aid cutoff by suspending ministerial talks and halting family 
reunions. 
tious, but the final resolution of the Banco Delta Asia prob-
lem—the US Treasury had designated the bank as a money-
laundering concern—and apparent progress in the Six-Party 
Talks  led  to  a  resumption  of  large-scale  aid  (400,000  MT 
of rice) in July 2007, for the first time sent overland. Seri-
ous flooding in August once again generated new emergency 
commitments, and in the run-up to the inter-Korean summit 
meeting in October, the Roh administration outlined a wide 
array of bilateral economic initiatives, including massive ener-
gy support, expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
and new industrial parks on both the east and west coasts. 
These commitments did not bind the incoming govern-
ment,  however.  Lee  Myung  Bak  had  run  on  a  platform 
of reciprocity: that both aid and other forms of economic 
cooperation would be extended only after North Korea had 
met its commitments under the February and October 2007 
Six-Party agreements. After his inauguration, there was uncer-
tainty about whether this concept of reciprocity extended to 
humanitarian assistance. Not until late March 2008—over a 
month into his presidency—did President Lee clarify that he 
would extend humanitarian assistance regardless of progress 
in the nuclear talks but only if North Korea requested it. By 
the time of this clarification, North Korea had decided to 
pursue a highly confrontational policy toward the South, and 
in early April 2008, despite clear signs of a deterioration in 
the food picture, Pyongyang announced it would not seek aid 
from South Korea, turning almost immediately to China for 
assistance. 
Given that South Korea maintains stocks of rice, the admin-
istration can quickly reverse course and provide emergency aid 
if North Korea concurred, either through the WFP—which 
it  is  currently  supporting—or  bilaterally.  The  South  Korean 
government  could  also  possibly  circumvent  official  channels 
by providing support through nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs),  although  this  option  was  recently  complicated  by 
an important fraud scandal involving Ministry of Unification 
funds. But even if tensions were to ease, a crucial opportunity 
may have been missed with respect to the fertilizer needed to 
support the spring 2008 planting, setting in train a desperate 
scramble for domestic and foreign sources of supply in North 
Korea well into 2009.
The United States can provide 
aid in ways that maximize its 
humanitarian impact while limiting 
the degree to which aid simply 
serves to bolster the regime. N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 6    mA Y   2 0 0 8
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China
China’s food trade with North Korea involves a number of 
components that are difficult to separate: regular food aid and 
subsidies from the central government; a “gift economy” of 
one-off commitments associated with high-level diplomatic 
meetings; large-scale commercial trade from provincial enti-
ties in the northeast; and a border trade that involves small 
traders, families, and to a lesser extent North Korean refugees. 
A number of foreign NGOs also run their food operations 
through China, although the number doing so has probably 
fallen since NGO operations in the country were curtailed in 
the fall of 2005. 
Given the fact that the Chinese treat their aid to North 
Korea as a state secret, it is wise not to try to parse the compo-
nents of China’s trade too finely but to focus on trends in 
Chinese  exports  of  cereals,  diplomatic  activity,  and  policy 
statements. 
China–North Korea trade has a substantial commercial 
component and so it is almost certainly with food (Haggard 
and Noland 2007b). Aggregate food exports rose with the 
deepening  of  the  bilateral  economic  relationship  since  the 
onset of the nuclear crisis; as a result, the share of cereals in 
Chinese exports fell steadily (figure 2). Between the fall of 
2005 and the fall of 2007, grain exports were relatively flat. 
They turn up after that point in dollar terms, but as we show 
in  the  following  section  this  apparent  increase  in  exports 
corresponds with a sharp increase in world market prices. It 
cannot, therefore, be inferred that Chinese grain exports to 
North Korea increased in quantity terms; it is not even clear 
through March 2008 whether past quantities of grain were 
even being sustained.12 
The data correspond closely to what we know about the 
course of Chinese policy.13 Following the US Treasury Depart-
ment’s designation of Banco Delta Asia as a money-laundering 
concern, North Korea’s commercial relations were disrupted, 
and Kim Jong Il became even more dependent on his Chinese 
patrons. But on Kim Jong Il’s “southern tour” of China in 
early  2006  he  badly  miscalculated  Chinese  willingness  to 
provide  more  assistance.  The  aid  relationship  was  further 
strained by the missile and nuclear tests; China even voted in 
12. Interestingly, the Chinese customs service stopped reporting quantity data 
on China–North Korea trade after 2006.
13. The most intriguing source to emerge in this regard is the publication 
in Japanese of China’s Secret File on Relations with North Korea (Takitachosen 
Chugoku Kimitsu Fairu) edited and translated by Satoshi Tomisaka and pur-
portedly written largely by an official of the International Department of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. Regardless of the veracity of 
this report, its findings comport closely with both other academic studies and 
contemporaneous press accounts and Chinese statements. See most notably 
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Figure 2    Chinese cereal exports to North Korea, February 1998–January 2008
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the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea 
(although the sanctions did not include all trade or food). (For 
a particularly vivid illustration of Chinese exasperation with 
North Korean behavior, see box 1 on rail wagons.) 
Moreover, rising prices were creating a second and probably 
even more important problem: Concerns about inflation led 
Chinese  authorities  to  impose  a  succession  of  controls  over 
food exports.14 In mid-December 2007, China’s Ministry of 
Finance announced it was eliminating a 13 percent tax rebate 
on grain exports; the change in policy affected 84 categories of 
grain and included wheat, corn, rice, and soybeans.15 At the end 
of December it went further, declaring that over the course of 
2008 it would impose further export taxes ranging from 5 to 
25 percent on grain exports.16 In early January, the Ministry 
of Commerce announced that it would exercise discretionary 
quotas over the export of milled grain. If the first famine is a 
reliable guide, we would expect rising food prices to spur further 
14. A number of southern provinces also suffered from unusual cold, ice, and 
snow in January and February 2008, but these appear to have affected primar-
ily crops other than staples; nonetheless, the broader pressure on production, 
stocks, and prices no doubt influenced the government’s response. 
15. The ministry did permit a grace period through the end of February 2008 
for contracts that could not be renegotiated. 
16. The rates for wheat and wheat products are 20 and 25 percent, respective-
ly. The rate for corn, rice, and soybean is 5 percent, while that for processed 
corn, rice, and soybean products is 10 percent.
commercialization  of  the  China–North  Korea  relationship 
as trading firms scramble for supplies and small traders jump 
into the breach. But these activities are taking place against the 
constraints posed by dramatically rising prices. 
As a result, the Chinese role in alleviating the crisis will 
depend in part on its willingness to step into the breach with 
expanded aid commitments. China almost certainly has large 
stocks of grain. Informal reports to us suggest that the Chinese 
have stepped up assistance, providing 50,000 MT of aid through 
April. We have also seen very high-level diplomatic initiatives, 
including from Kim Jong Il himself, seeking to ingratiate the 
regime to Beijing.17 But a combination of political and economic 
factors appears to be limiting China’s willingness to aggressively 
step into the breach. 
A US Role?
 
In 2005, the United States shifted toward more active diplomatic 
engagement with North Korea, extending carrots that included 
removal from the State Department’s terrorism list; lifting of 
the restrictions under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers  Act,  successor  to  the Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act; 
and  orchestration  of  heavy-fuel  oil  shipments.  However,  in 
September  2007,  under  the  political  cover  of  the  August 
floods, the administration first signaled that it would consider 
resuming  food  aid.  In  December  an  intraagency  delegation 
visited Pyongyang to discuss the aid relationship, including the 
possibility of rerouting US contributions away from the WFP, 
with which the North Koreans had a problematic relationship, 
and  through  American  NGOs.  In  April  2008,  the  Bush 
administration publicly stated that it would entertain a very 
large food aid package of 500,000 MT once the North Koreans 
had provided a satisfactory nuclear declaration. 
Such a commitment would obviously have major impact, 
but it faced a number of economic as well as political constraints, 
including  rapidly  rising  food  prices,  demands  for  assistance 
elsewhere,  stipulations  of  the  North  Korean  Human  Rights 
Act of 2004, and revelations of a North Korea–Syria nuclear 
connection.18 But the issue is one of geography and timing 
17. These include a rare personal visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang; 
see Snyder (2008) and “Kim Jong Il Restores North-China Relations [sic],” 
Daily NK, March 3, 2008. 
18. The North Korean Human Rights Act required that US nonhumanitarian 
assistance be contingent on North Korea making “substantial progress” on 
a number of specific human rights issues and that the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) issue a report to Congress on 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea and North Koreans in China and to 
report any changes in the transparency, monitoring, and access of food aid and 
other humanitarian activities. It also required that any “significant increases” 
in humanitarian assistance be conditioned on “substantial improvements” 
in transparency, monitoring, and access. It is, of course, possible that the 
Box 1    Rail wagons
Perhaps nothing illustrates the way that North Korea can 
poison relations with major donors than an infamous 00 
episode,  when  China  halted  railroad  shipments  to  North 
Korea  in  response  to  North  Korean  theft  of  Chinese  rail 
wagons. Starting on September 0, UN relief agencies, which 
warehouse supplies in China, were not allocated the wagons 
required to ship aid in the wake of the August floods. The 
Chinese Railway Ministry subsequently informed them that 
the action was undertaken in response to the loss of 1,800 
rail wagons in North Korea. 
As  one  UN  official  explained, “Our  food  is  sitting  in 
warehouses in China bagged and ready to be loaded, but 
our  suppliers  are  not  being  allocated  wagons.”  On  the 
weekend of October 1–1, North Korea began returning 
the cars and Chinese authorities started allocating them to 
the relief agencies on a one-for-one basis. As the story began 
to appear in the world press, China relented, and by October 
0, a substantial volume of aid was again flowing across the 
border.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 6    mA Y   2 0 0 8
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as well as policy. Even if the United States were to act with 
alacrity, it would be weeks and perhaps even months before the 
government or its agents could acquire this amount of grain and 
aid would start to flow to the country. The reasons, again, have 
to do in part with the changed commercial environment. 
 
III. EVIDENCE FROM PRICES
Just as the poorest members of society are most vulnerable in 
shortages, the poorest countries are most vulnerable when global 
markets are under stress. World cereal stocks have fallen to a 25-
year low and prices have risen at a pace not seen since the world 
food crisis of the mid-1970s, driven by a hotly debated mix of 
biofuel production and subsidies, rising demand for meat and 
grain from high-growth markets such as China, increasing fuel 
prices (which affect both input and transportation costs), and 
some troublesome aspects of Asian markets in particular.19 
North Koreans would acquiesce to these conditions or that they might be 
waived—and perhaps rightly—under the duress of the spreading emergency.
19. See, for example, FAO’s Crop Prospects and Food Situation, and from a 
more commercial perspective, International Grains Council, Grain Market 
Report, various issues. Movements in the market are also a function of national 
policies. In contrast to other grains and commodities, such as wheat and soy-
beans, rice is thinly traded; only about 30 MMT are exported annually, and a 
handful of Asian suppliers play a pivotal role. On the export side, a number of 
major governments in addition to China have imposed various export curbs; 
even when these have subsequently been lifted or modified, they have added to 
overall uncertainty. India is reported to have provided an unspecified amount 
North  Korean  authorities  do  not,  of  course,  provide 
information on market prices; to the contrary they have acted 
to  squelch  the  outflow  of  such  information.  Nonetheless, 
the growth of trade across the Chinese border, the operation 
of NGOs out of China, including particularly South Korean 
ones, and the spread of technologies such as illicit cell phones 
in the border areas have allowed outside researchers to assemble 
data  on  prices.20  These  data—fragmentary  and  imperfectly 
observed—indicate that food prices have nearly tripled over the 
last year, with grain prices rising even more rapidly (figure 3). 
of food aid to North Korea, but it imposed bans on exports of nonbasmati rice 
as early as October 2007 before subsequently easing them and then reimpos-
ing controls in March 2008. Vietnam, the second largest exporter of rice, also 
imposed an effective ban on exports in March 2008, announcing that it would 
be in place through June. Indonesia announced in April 2008 that it would 
curb medium-grade rice exports to combat inflation; the state procurement 
agency Bulog would be allowed to sell medium-grade rice overseas only when 
national stocks were above 3 MMT and domestic prices below a govern-
ment-set target price. Thai behavior has been the source of particularly intense 
speculation; even small hints that the largest rice exporter might impose 
restrictions have been accompanied by large price movements. Importers have 
also compounded market instability; Japan, Bangladesh, and particularly the 
Philippines made major rice purchases in 2008 as a hedge against uncertainty, 
adding to speculative pressures.
20.  Our data are assembled primarily from observations reported in Good 
Friends’ publication North Korea Today, DailyNK, and other Korean-language 
academic and media sources. As with all data on and from North Korea, these 
series too should be treated with caution. The data are spotty, markets are 
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 Figure 3    North Korea nominal food prices, October 2004–April 2008
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These adverse price trends have three devastating effects: 
•  Rising prices make it more difficult for North Korea to 
import grain on commercial terms. 
•  Adverse price trends make it more difficult for multilateral 
and bilateral aid agencies to access grain and meet their 
commitments. 
•  Price  inflation  has  a  direct  effect  on  North  Korean 
households, which have become more dependent over time 
on markets for food. 
The simplest explanation for these price movements is that 
North Korean markets are surprisingly integrated in price terms 
with trends in global market prices; this is an important finding, 
showing that the North Korean economy is increasingly affected 
by external developments.21 However, as figure 3 shows, global 
trends  are  greatly  magnified  in  North  Korea  by  the  perfect 
storm of conditions that has hit the country over the last year: 
production shortfalls associated with the floods and ongoing 
problems in the agricultural sector; political strains emanating 
from  deteriorating  aid  relationships  and  corresponding 
adjustment  of  market  expectations;  and  some  self-defeating 
policy responses of the government, which we consider in more 
detail below. 
Table 1 reports price data from cities reflecting a variety of 
circumstances: 
•  Wonsan and Hamheung are on the east coast; price trends 
there are particularly noteworthy because the industrialized 
east coast was hit particularly hard by the famine of the 
mid-1990s. 
•  Hoeryong  is  an  important  land  port  near  the  Chinese 
border and a gateway to the special economic zone in Rajin 
Sonbong; it should reflect some of the advantages of sitting 
close to the Chinese border. 
•  Sariwon  is  located  directly  south  of  Pyongyang  and  is 
the main trading center for the breadbasket region of the 
country and was severely affected by the floods of 2007. 
•  Pyongyang  is  the  capital  city  and  not  only  the  seat  of 
political power but also the core of the regime’s support; it 
has long been considered a privilege to live in the city, and 
we might expect its residents to be protected from adverse 
price developments. 
21. Grain prices display a seasonal pattern, tending to fall in the autumn after 
the harvest and peak in the spring. Yet these seasonal movements virtually 
disappear when we consider the magnitude of recent price changes: The 
overall price index shows a trend increase from late 2004, a spike following 
the August 2007 flooding, and then a dramatic acceleration of price inflation. 
The magnitude of the recent acceleration of food price inflation dominates the 
earlier response of markets to the missile and nuclear tests, sanctions, and even 
the floods of 2006 and 2007.
Although there are regional variations, the price increases 
are uniformly large, clearly outstripping world price inflation. 
Moreover, the regional differences do not provide comfort. The 
advantages of Hoeryong’s proximity to the Chinese border are 
not apparent: Corn prices are somewhat lower, but the city 
shows the largest price increases of all the cities in the sample. 
But the most striking observation is that Pyongyang does not 
appear protected from these price changes. Of course, incomes 
in Pyongyang are higher too, making it easier for households to 
manage these price increases than in poorer parts of the country. 
Moreover,  a  substantial  but  unknown  share  of  Pyongyang 
residents  including  government  officials,  military  personnel, 
and workers in favored state-owned enterprises have continued 
access  to  supplies  through  the  PDS,  where  their  needs  are 
prioritized.  However,  for  those  Pyongyang  residents  outside 
of these privileged networks, or to the extent that privileged 
channels of supply are also feeling stress, residents of Pyongyang 
are as exposed to the market as households elsewhere in the 
country. Begging children are now seen in the city’s poorer 
neighborhoods.
These price increases pose problems across the developing 
world. But it is important to underscore that their effects are 
particularly acute in North Korea because of the fraying of the 
institutions of the socialist economy and the domestic policy 
response of the regime. 
 
IV. DOMESTIC POLICY RESPONSE
Food is at the core of any social contract: Governments that 
cannot provide food to at least some core set of supporters are 
invariably running deep political risks. The centrality of food 
to the maintenance of political power helps explain both the 
Table 1     Food prices in selected 
                     North Korean cities, March   
                     and April 2008 (prices in won)
City Month Rice Corn
Hamheung March 1,00 0
April ,00–,00 1,100–1,00
Hoeryong March 1,00 0–0
April ,00 1,100
Pyongyang March 1,800–1,00 1,000
April ,00 1,00–1,00
Sariwon March 1,00   00
April ,100 1,00
Wonsan March 1,00    00
April ,00 1,00–1,00
Source: Good Friends, North Korea Today.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 6    mA Y   2 0 0 8
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relentless aid-seeking of North Korean foreign policy and the 
government’s reluctance to allow private farming and markets 
to  allocate  food.  Liberalization  and  more  wide-ranging 
marketization  appear  to  mean  not  only  higher  prices  and 
growing inequality but also migration of supply away from state 
channels—including those serving the military—and into the 
hands of farmers, traders, and “middlemen.” 
In the current setting, however, the swing toward controls 
is likely to have particularly profound consequences. For most 
citizens, the PDS has not been a reliable source of food since the 
great famine. As a result, it has proven impossible for the regime 
to eradicate private production and trading; in the absence of a 
fully functioning PDS, to do so would condemn the population 
to  even  worse  circumstances  than  we  are  now  witnessing. 
But continued efforts to limit private production, trade, and 
movement have had perverse and unintended effects. 
We focus on three sets of institutions and policy areas that 
provide further evidence on the current crisis. 
•  Cooperative farms are experiencing severe distress. As a 
result, the government is experiencing difficulty securing 
grain and supplying the PDS and the military with food. 
•  The  government  has  shown  an  ongoing  ambivalence 
with respect to the emergence of markets, undercutting 
important access to livelihoods and food. 
•  The regime has also cracked down on movement across 
the border, which not only is interrupting migration but 
also appears to be interrupting much-needed commercial 
activities. 
Once Again, the Breakdown of Public Distribution 
 
The PDS has been a key political-cum-economic institution 
in North Korea. Prior to the great famine of the mid-1990s, 
the  government  set  production  quotas  to  the  cooperatives, 
distributed  farmers’  rations  at  the  time  of  the  harvest,  and 
distributed food to urban residents through the PDS at nominal 
prices; markets played virtually no role in the allocation of food. 
During the famine, households relied on distribution through 
work units, the market, barter, private farming activities, and 
even foraging. The army and some unknown share of the upper 
civil service and workers at privileged state-owned enterprises 
supposedly enjoyed the benefits of distribution through separate 
channels, although these channels did not deliver full rations 
during the famine either. 
The influx of foreign aid in the late 1990s partially revived 
the PDS as donors had no independent channels for distributing 
food. But marketization also continued apace, driven by partial 
reforms such as allowing some private plots and farmers markets, 
as well as de facto marketization through diversion of food aid 
and cooperative output and commercial trade across the Chinese 
border. Our calculations suggest that roughly 50 percent of total 
consumption in North Korea was sourced through the market 
in the early 2000s, and WFP reports have suggested that poor 
households were spending up to 80 percent of total income on 
food (Haggard and Noland 2007a).
On the demand side, in August 2005, the government 
decided to reinstate the PDS as of October 1 and to ban private 
trading in grain. The ability of the government to implement this 
policy varied across the country, and eventually the government 
was forced to quietly shelve the policy as PDS sites were not 
able to meet targets and markets for grain began to reemerge. 
Up through the floods of August 2007, the data indicate that 
prices  were  at  least  relatively  stable,  although  characterized 
by substantial dispersion across North Korea’s geographically 
fragmented markets. 
Historically, the North Korean government’s supply-side 
response to urban food shortages has been to confiscate food 
in rural areas. In late 2005 reports emerged of the government 
forcibly extracting food in contravention of the rules determining 
the disposition of cooperative farm output, though it is unclear 
just how widely this occurred. In the wake of the 2007 floods, 
it appears that such moves were intensified in renewed efforts to 
impose direct levies for additional supplies. First, the government 
increased production quotas for the next crop cycle. Second, 
the government began to crack down on embezzlement and 
corruption on the part of cooperative managers and the growth 
of trade and barter of rice among the administrators charged 
with managing food distribution. Although spiraling prices no 
doubt created incentives for corruption, some of these activities 
may simply have reflected an effort on the part of cooperative 
managers  to  protect  their  members.  Third,  the  government 
began to express concern that cooperative farmers would divert 
effort from the current cooperative planting into the tending of 
private plots; as a result, new restrictions were placed on some 
of these activities as well.22 
However, the more intense the levies on grain and the 
controls on private plots, the more clearly the government is 
signaling  the  likelihood  of  continuing  distress  in  the  future 
and the more likely farmers will respond rationally by seeking 
22.  An important example in this regard is the effort to suppress the so-called 
nonpublic management distribution practice, or “six-month farming,” under 
which displaced workers would be able to rent unused or underproductive 
cooperative land. See North Korea Today 118, April 2008. 
The North Korean regime’s controls 
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to protect themselves. As early as the fall harvest, stories were 
surfacing of farmers seeking to hide and hoard grain, a critical 
development prior to the great famine of the 1990s as well.23 
A  similar  set  of  dilemmas  faces  the  government  in  the 
urban areas and in major work units; in the absence of food, 
workers have little incentive to report to work. Reports of the 
suspension of rations in the PDS and larger enterprises began 
extremely early in the distribution cycle, as early as October 
2007.  The  source  of  the  difficulties  included  not  only  the 
aggregate constraint on supply but also shortages of electricity 
for threshing and fuel for transportation. By February 2008, 
Good Friends was reporting cuts in food rations to lower-level 
white-collar  officials  and  shortages  of  supply  in  Pyongyang, 
though other sources could not confirm this claim. 
   
Responding to Markets and Traders
The wider problems in the North Korean economy and the 
breakdown  of  the  PDS  pose  important  challenges  for  the 
government. The first is the migration of labor out of the state 
sector and into market activities. Women have played a crucial 
role in this regard, forming the backbone of the general markets 
that emerged following the partial reform effort of 2002. As a 
result they are escaping not only from the workplace but also from 
ideological indoctrination and the various levies—including of 
“voluntary” labor—on which the government relies.
The  second  problem  posed  by  the  markets  is  an 
informational  one.  General  markets  have  been  fed  by  the 
burgeoning cross-border trade with China in consumer goods. 
This trade has not only revealed the higher quality of Chinese 
and other foreign products but also included a wide array of 
cultural  products,  undermining  ideological  control  and  the 
government monopoly on information: from small televisions 
capable of receiving Chinese broadcasts in border areas to South 
Korean music videos and DVDs and even mobile phones. The 
campaign against the market is not just economic but has a 
strong  ideological  component,  emphasizing  the  antisocialist 
nature of market activities and their effect of spreading an overly 
favorable view of South Korea. 
Finally  and  most  obviously,  continued  trading  in  grain 
poses a direct challenge to the regime, as households are forced 
to rely on the market in the face of rapidly rising prices. 
As a result of these challenges, the recent effort to control the 
market has not been limited to food but has been a wider assault 
on market activity—for example, the imposition of escalating 
age restrictions on market traders in the fall of 2007, ultimately 
banning women under 50 from trading in general markets or 
jangmadang.  From  mid-January  2008,  the  government  also 
23. See North Korea Today 95, October 2007. 
stepped up inspections on the general markets to control the 
range of goods on offer, with the apparent intention of reverting 
to the more limited farmers markets, which were permitted to 
trade only in supplementary foodstuffs. 
These efforts at control are unlikely to be fully successful: 
Age restrictions are circumvented by bringing grandparents into 
the market; regulated markets have been supplemented by new 
“alley markets,” which shift trading to new venues; and traders 
undoubtedly  will  seek  to  bribe  inspectors.24  However,  the 
restrictions have nonetheless sewn uncertainty about alternative 
sources  of  livelihood  for  households  just  as  food  prices  are 
requiring them to seek other sources of income and barter. 
There  is  also  some  evidence  that  the  efforts  to  exercise 
control may influence cross-border trade. Larger trading entities 
in  the  land  ports  along  the  border,  particularly  in  Sinuiju, 
have also fallen under government scrutiny. In a noteworthy 
development in April 2008, the central government dispatched 
a team of 200 investigators to Sinuiju in the name of an Anti-
Socialist  Conscience  Investigation  to  inspect  the  books  of 
foreign trade organizations, necessarily affecting market activity 
as a result.25 
We are doubtful that imposing controls is likely to generate 
an overt social or political backlash; the barriers to collective 
action  in  North  Korea  are  well-known.  But  an  interesting 
episode in March 2008 in Chongjin suggests complex political 
risks  for  the  regime  and  that  the  markets  themselves  could 
become the locus of protest and everyday forms of resistance. In 
early March, city officials sought to enforce the age restriction 
on women traders. In what appeared like a coordinated action 
across several markets in the city, on March 4 large groups of 
women staged protests against the ban on trading. On March 
5 municipal authorities took the unusual step of reopening the 
markets under the authority of the local ministry of labor but 
were subsequently forced to reverse course and enforce the ban 
at the insistence of the central government. The episode reveals 
24. See, for example, “Jangmadang to Be Converted to Farmers Markets,” 
Daily NK, February 13, 2008. 
25.  See North Korea Today 118, April 2008. 
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likely tensions between the objectives of the center and local 
officials squeezed between the absence of resources, mounting 
political and social pressures, and the risks of repression.
   
The Border Problem
A final set of policy dilemmas relate to the land border with 
China. The dramatic increase in trade with China has resulted in 
the creation of dense business networks that include both major 
Chinese and North Korean enterprises, smaller Chinese-Korean 
businesses, and North Koreans with relatives in China who are 
permitted to travel, albeit only with the greatest of difficulty. 
The major land ports on the North Korean side of the border, 
particularly Sinuiju, have become not only trading centers but 
also major distribution hubs for the rest of the country. 
But  the  border  poses  a  risk  to  both  North  Korea  and 
China. As circumstances deteriorate, the incentives to move 
into China rise, either permanently or in search of business 
opportunities and food; illicit border trade in drugs, particularly 
methamphetamines,  has  also  been  widely  reported  as  has 
smuggling of scrap metal and other products. Such movements 
not only pose the ideological and informational risks already 
noted but also in extremis could even undermine the regime 
altogether, as was the case in Eastern Europe.26 An additional 
motive for control is provided by the Olympics and the prospect 
that  incidents  involving  North  Koreans  could  embarrass 
China. 
Prior to changes in the North Korean penal code in 2004, a 
person who illegally crossed a “frontier of the Republic” faced a 
sentence of up to three years in a kwalliso (a political penal labor 
colony), but those who did not appear politically dangerous 
were sent to a village unit labor camp, where they would spend 
between three months and three years in forced labor.27 Those 
classified as “political offenders” faced more severe penalties. 
In “serious” cases, defectors or asylum seekers are subjected to 
indefinite terms of imprisonment and forced labor, confiscation 
of property, or death.28 Regulations under the 2004 penal code 
appear  to  have  codified  the  differential  treatment  between 
economic refugees and those cases deemed political, stipulating 
lighter sentences for those crossing for economic reasons. Yet 
not surprisingly, the legal revisions did not necessarily reflect 
reality: Interviews with 30 refugees conducted between 2005 
26. For example, Nicholas Eberstadt and Christopher Griffin, “Saving North 
Korea’s Refugees: The Case for Action,” International Herald Tribune, February 
20, 2007. 
27. For an overview of the refugee issue, see Haggard and Noland (2006). 
28. Facilitating exit is also a crime. Under Article 118 of the criminal code, 
an official with the “frontier administration” who helps “someone to violate a 
frontier” faces stiff penalties: a sentence in a kwalliso for a period of between 
two and seven years.
and 2007—even before the more recent crackdown—suggest 
that judicial proceedings were often skipped, torture remained 
prevalent in detention facilities, and death rates in incarceration 
were high (Muico 2007).
The  rollback  in  2005  was  accompanied  by  a  dramatic 
crackdown  on  border  movements.  The  crackdown  was 
intensified in the aftermath of the 2007 floods and the initial 
ban on women trading in markets but accelerated as the Tumen 
River  began  to  freeze  in  early  winter,  providing  the  bridge 
through which most exit occurs. From November 2007, reports 
from North Korea indicate the organization of Anti-Socialist 
Conscience Investigation Patrols (ASCIPs) to control internal 
movements in North Hamkyung province and to confiscate 
“contraband.”29 The most dramatic signal sent by the regime 
was the public execution of 15 people, 13 of them women, in 
Onsung on February 20, 2008 on charges of trafficking. But 
sentences have also been increased; single border crossings not 
related to South Korea or having political overtones that were 
previously overlooked now carry sentences of three years, with 
those found guilty of multiple crossings—even if not political—
receiving sentences of up to ten years.30 In an interesting signal 
of the seriousness attached to this issue and concerns about the 
pervasiveness of corruption along the border, the police have 
even been granted new authority to incarcerate without going 
through prosecutors and to exercise some control over border 
security agents and even military personnel.31 
The economic implications of these new restrictions are 
impossible to estimate; illicit border trade is relatively small and 
remittances passed through informal channels are unlikely to be 
very large either. However, the border has represented a partial 
29. The seven “antisocialist” crimes against which the ASCIPs were formed are 
human trafficking; the effort to secure transit of family members to South Ko-
rea; the receipt of transfers from China, South Korea, and Japan; the receipt of 
commissions for connecting families in the North and South through China 
through mobile phones; drug sales or trading with Chinese drug dealers; 
unemployment (an interesting indicator of the political function of control of 
the economy); and unregistered lodging.
30.  Chinese nationals have also been arrested for these activities, perhaps 
reflecting a growing concern for the growing economic influence wielded by 
Chinese networks within the North Korean economy.
31. North Korea Today 115, March 2008. 
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escape valve both through movement and trade. In conjunction, 
the observations about the PDS, the response to the growth 
of general markets, and the approach to the border cast some 
doubt on the more hopeful diagnoses that have appeared over 
the course of last year that North Korea is poised to undertake a 
leap toward a more wide-ranging economic reform and opening. 
Facing mounting constraints, the regime has rather opted for 
controls, a number of which are likely to have perverse effects 
and directly limit the opportunities for households to cope with 
distress.  
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
    RECOMMENDATIONS
Our findings are easily restated. Triangulating across a variety of 
sources of evidence, it is clear that North Korea now stands on 
the precipice of famine. 
•  The  aggregate  balance  between  grain  requirements  and 
supply is more precarious than at any time since the great 
famine of the mid-1990s.
•  Aid faces economic as well as political constraints and the 
prospects of commercial imports are limited by the world 
food crisis, which is now in full force. 
•  Domestic  food  prices  show  the  kind  of  sharp  inflection 
and price inflation that are typical of pre-famine or famine 
settings. 
•  The institutions of the food economy are fraying as they 
have in the past but with much less scope for the market 
to provide an alternative source of supply; lack of fertilizer 
means that even if food aid is forthcoming, the 2008 harvest 
may be down, implying a crisis into 2009.
•  The domestic policy response is exacerbating uncertainty 
and volatility in the market. 
Although it is scant comfort, there are reasons to believe that 
the crisis of 2008 will not approach the magnitude of the great 
famine of the mid-1990s. In the early 1990s, the regime allowed 
the situation to deteriorate for years on end before appealing for 
aid. Famine or pre-famine conditions had probably emerged as 
early as 1993, but it was not until 1995 that the government 
appealed for help. It then took nearly six months before aid of 
any magnitude started to provide relief. 
However, it is important to underline that while we are 
very much better informed now than we were then, information 
remains scarce, and a similar set of political dynamics is in play 
in the current conjuncture. The regime is engaged in a protracted 
standoff over its nuclear weapons programs—now complicated 
by growing evidence of proliferation activities—which has once 
again blocked aid. 
As they were then, key patrons—China and South Korea—
are again finding it politically difficult to provide assistance. The 
support for aid has been further eroded by ongoing evidence of 
diversion, including to the military. 
Yet it is once again urgent to underline the primacy of 
the humanitarian imperative. While it is tempting to gamble 
that depriving the regime of food aid will spell its downfall, 
we cannot be assured of that eventuality. Such a policy would 
expose the most vulnerable of the population to the risks of 
malnutrition and even death. 
The  policy  conclusions  are  straightforward.  The  North 
Korean leadership needs to recognize that the path to a secure 
future lies not in the possession of nuclear weapons or a posture 
of  belligerence  but  in  security  cooperation,  détente,  and 
economic reform. 
The  long-run  solution  to  North  Korea’s  chronic  food 
insecurity problems is a revitalization of the industrial economy, 
which would allow North Korea to export industrial products, 
earn foreign exchange, and import bulk grains on a commercially 
sustainable basis, just as its neighbors South Korea, Japan, and 
China do. The success of this strategy will require significant 
progress toward final resolution of the nuclear issue.
In the short run, North Korea should openly acknowledge 
the growing crisis and conclude negotiations with the WFP and 
other donors so that assistance can begin to flow. South Korea 
has  now  clearly  offered  humanitarian  assistance,  and  North 
Korea should take up the offer. Pyongyang also needs to reverse a 
number of its recent self-defeating interventions so that farmers 
and households can cope with the current shortages and border 
trade in particular can provide at least some assistance. 
Yet our past experience does not suggest that we should 
hold our breath for these changes to commence, and thus the 
international community also needs to act. China and South 
Korea are pivotal because of their proximity and the availability 
of stocks, which can be released on short notice. China could 
reverse export controls, at least for North Korea, so that grain 
markets  on  the  border  can  start  to  function  even  if  in  the 
context of higher prices. Lifting these controls should extend to 
the operation of NGOs, including South Korean ones, which 
have  served  as  a  conduit—however  small—for  assistance  to 
the country. China should also commit to providing food aid, 
preferably through the WFP. 
In  South  Korea,  the  Lee  government’s  concerns  about 
reciprocity  are  fully  warranted,  and  providing  long-run 
development aid in the absence of either security cooperation 
or economic reform is unlikely to have beneficial effects. Yet 
President Lee’s statements regarding the independence of the 
humanitarian track are also justified. In the short run, the South 
Korean  government  might  be  able  to  finesse  North  Korean 
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The government might also use the network of NGOs that 
have evolved over the last decade as a face-saving channel for 
official relief. Despite recent concerns about malfeasance, the 
majority of these NGOs have operated with great dedication 
and  integrity.  Other  regional  players,  including  Thailand, 
Vietnam, and India, also have a role and should contemplate 
commitments through the WFP, other NGOs, and commercial 
channels; at a minimum, they should rethink any restraints on 
exports for this most needy of regional cases.
Finally, the Bush administration’s broader food initiatives 
of early May are highly welcome. The United States has also 
now  signaled  clearly  that  large-scale  food  commitments  to 
North  Korea  will  be  forthcoming  following  North  Korea’s 
nuclear declaration in the Six-Party Talks. In anticipation of a 
North Korean declaration, the United States should continue to 
undertake the planning with the WFP and/or NGOs that would 
permit rapid response once the political setting has changed. 
These channels should not be seen as competitive but should be 
used jointly to maximize the speedy release of food.32 
The  United  States  can  also  provide  aid  in  ways  that 
maximize its humanitarian impact while limiting the degree to 
which aid simply serves to bolster the regime. We know that 
aid is diverted. Yet given the fragmented nature of markets in 
North Korea, diverted aid often finds its way into markets in the 
catchment area where it is delivered. Geographically targeting 
aid to the most adversely affected regions and providing it in 
forms such as barley and millet that are not preferred by the elite 
can increase the ameliorative impact of assistance. 
The Bush administration has taken up the first part of this 
equation—requiring that most of its contribution to the WFP 
be targeted at the worst affected regions—but it could do more 
on the second part: providing aid in forms less preferred for elite 
consumption. It can also encourage others such as South Korea 
to follow suit.
The  United  States  should  also  exercise  quiet  leadership 
with respect to the refugee question. The Chinese government’s 
practice  of  returning  North  Korean  refugees  may  reflect  a 
natural self-protective response against the threat of a flood of 
migrants and even the breakdown of the North Korean regime; 
it was, after all, the notorious “hole in the fence” that helped 
precipitate the collapse of the Eastern European regimes. But 
32. The concern over the possibility of a “race to the bottom” with respect to 
standards of monitoring and verification is not without foundation, and it 
is essential that the North Korean government not be allowed to play relief 
organizations off against each other.
the policy of returning refugees does not conform with China’s 
obligations under the refugee treaty and does not in the end 
serve  the  country’s  underlying  political  objectives  either;  it 
simply serves to cut off another escape valve, however small, that 
has contributed to taking pressure off of a rapidly deteriorating 
situation. 
Opening North Korea, through whatever channels possible, 
is the ultimate route toward a more prosperous future; if this 
crisis contributes to that process, it would constitute the only 
silver lining we can see at the moment to what is otherwise yet 
another sad chapter in the history of the North Korean people. 
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